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The Nonjusticiability of Palestine:
Human Rights Litigation and the




The political question doctrine is a problematic and an often
misused or wrongly applied doctrine that frequently prevents United
States federal courts from fulfilling their Article III responsibilities.
Nowhere is this misapplication more prevalent than in human rights
cases involving Palestine, and in particular, cases involving Israeli
officials alleged to have committed violations of international law
against Palestinians. United States courts consistently dismiss these
cases as presenting nonjusticiable political questions.' In comparison,
United States courts typically do not dismiss cases under the political
question doctrine that are analytically and factually similar but
involve actions by foreign officials or citizens of countries other than
Israel.2 Similarly, United States courts have inconsistently applied the
political question doctrine in cases against the Palestinian Liberation
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Distinction; J.D., University of Iowa, with High Distinction; M.A. (American
Studies) University of Iowa; B.A., Political Science, University of Northern Iowa,
Highest Honors. The author was the plaintiffs' counsel in the case of Corrie v.
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College of the Law, March 20-21, 2011. I would like to thank all of those who
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1. The courts also often find that such cases should be dismissed on other bases,
such as the Act of State doctrine or due to foreign sovereign immunity.
2. See discussion infra at 31-32. Cases against United States officials, however,
are often dismissed under the political question doctrine, even though cases against
foreign officials are not.
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Organization (PLO) and corporations alleged to have aided and
abetted Israeli practices that violated international law.
As currently fashioned, the political question doctrine is vague
and challenging for courts to apply, especially in cases in which
foreign policy is a concern. Not only has this resulted in courts'
inconsistent applications of the doctrine, but it has also allowed
inappropriate biases and prejudices - whether conscious or not - to
interfere with a court's decision to hear otherwise proper and
justiciable cases.
The dismissal of what should otherwise be justiciable cases is in
direct contradiction to what the founders of the United States so
strongly desired for their new, young country - that the United States
provide a forum and remedy for civil tort cases alleging violations of
the law of nations.' This desire to provide a remedy for violations of
the law of nations was accomplished when Congress enacted the
Alien Tort Statute5 (ATS) as part of the First Judiciary Act in 1789.
The ATS gives federal courts jurisdiction over claims brought by
aliens for torts in violation of "the law of nations," now referred to as
customary international law.6
This Article discusses in detail United States court decisions
3. At the outset, I would like to note that I often agree with the courts' analyses
when allowing cases, such as those against the PLO to proceed, as I believe the
political question doctrine should be narrowly applied. My issues are with the cases
involving Israeli actions that are routinely dismissed.
4. There is significant consensus among scholars that at the time of our
country's founding, the founders sought to ensure that the young country would
comply with the law of nations, which included providing a remedy for violations of
the law of nations. See, e.g., Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Alien Tort Claims Act;
Theoretical and Historical Foundations of the Alien Tort Claims Act and its
Discontents: A Reality Check, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 585 (2004); William Dodge,
The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some Observations on Text and
Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 705-08 (2002); Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort
Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587 (2002).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789). The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) reads, "The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." The
ATS was enacted as Section 9 of the Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77 (1789)
[hereinafter First Judiciary Act]. It was one of just a handful of statutes enacted at
the time giving jurisdiction to the federal courts.
6. The terms "law of nations" and "customary international law" will be used
interchangeably in this Article. The "law of nations" is generally equated with
customary international law. See The Estralla, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 298, 307-08 (1819)
(referring to non-treaty-based law of nations as the "the customary . . . law of
nations"); Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 237 n.2 (2d Cir. 2003).
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regarding the political question doctrine raised in human rights
litigation and analyzes decisions in cases involving Palestine. Part II
provides the framework and describes the origins of the political
question doctrine. Part III summarizes the doctrine's emergence and
applicability in human rights litigation in the United States. Part IV
discusses the contradictory and problematic dismissal of cases alleging
Israeli illegal actions based on political question grounds. The Article
argues that only when the political question doctrine is clarified,
narrowed, or reformulated can cases arising in clearly political
contexts be adjudicated with more analytical consistency, resulting in
less biases and prejudices. Courts should dismiss using the political
question doctrine only those cases that raise questions that the United
States Constitution clearly and directly reserves for another branch of
government, that is, questions for one of the political branches.
II. The Political Question Doctrine
A. Origins of the Political Question Doctrine: Marbury v. Madison
Just thirteen years after enactment of the ATS, the Supreme
Court in Marbury v. Madison first articulated what we now refer to as
the "political question doctrine" by stating the oft-quoted
admonition, "questions, by their nature political, or which are, by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made
by this court."' This admonition has been cited by courts invoking
the political question doctrine in dismissing numerous cases but often
without understanding the entire context in which this sentence arose.
Courts have typically ignored the other admonition contained in the
opinion which directly follows: "but where a specific duty is assigned
by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that
duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself
injured, has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy."8
Although Marbury is best known for establishing the Supreme
Court's power of judicial review, the Court also established that
discretionary performance of certain duties given to the executive
branch in the Constitution that do not concern the rights of others are
political issues and not reviewable by the Court.! However, the Court
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
8. Id. at 166.
9. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 166 (emphasis added) ("[These decisions] respect the
nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the
1012012]
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made it clear that where such officers have a duty under the law, and
where individual rights depend on that duty, breaching that duty
entitles the individual to a remedy, the adjudication of which is not a
political question. 1
The Marbury court was most concerned with ensuring that courts
do not impede the manner in which the executive branch performed
its duties concerning matters in which it has discretion. It was not
concerned with restraining courts from adjudicating whether the
individual has a right and deciding the remedy. In fact, the sentence
immediately preceding the oft-quoted admonition reads, "the
province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals,
not to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform
duties in which they have a discretion."" Thus, what the Court meant
by "questions, by their nature political" is not elusive; it meant those
questions concerning the manner in which one of the other branches
carries out its duties reserved to it alone by the Constitution. It did
not mean questions involving the determination of legal duties, rights,
and remedies. Importantly, the Court also clearly specified that
"questions, by their nature political" did not mean decisions about
"what the law is."12 The Court opined that "what the law is," is the
sole responsibility of the judiciary," perhaps especially where such
rulings might differ from the opinions of the Executive or Congress.
B. The Continued Development of the Political Question Doctrine
Baker v. Carr sets forth the modern political question doctrine.14
The Court explained that the inextricable presence of one of the
following six situations, or factors, from the case may suggest that a
political question exists ("Baker factors"): (1) a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment to a coordinate political
department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
executive is conclusive.").
10. Id.
11. Id. at 170.
12. Id. at 177-78 ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial
Department [the judicial branch] to say what the law is.").
13. Id.
14. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962).
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resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question." The analysis of whether a political
question exists in each case requires "a discriminating analysis of the
particular question posed," including the history of its management
by the political branches, its susceptibility to judicial handling, and the
potential consequences of judicial action." This last factor is
problematic because lower courts could interpret it to address
concerns more prudential in nature than jurisdictional. However, this
last factor should be interpreted simply to mean that the judicial
action's consequences might indicate that the case involves a political
question.
Baker recognized that in cases involving foreign relations, there
will be occasions in which courts will not be able to try the issue: if
there are no judicial standards for redress, if the case involves
exercising discretion which is demonstrably committed to the
legislative or executive branches or if there are unique questions
demanding that the United States speak with one voice.17 However,
the Baker court cautioned, "it is an error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial
cognizance."' The political question doctrine "is one of 'political
questions,' not one of 'political cases.'" 9
The political question doctrine reflects a concern for the
separation of powers among the branches of the United States
government.2 Ultimately, in outlining the six Baker factors, the
Supreme Court attempted to explain the different situations in which
a case might present issues that violate the separation of powers. A
"yes" answer to any of these questions might indicate a separation of
powers problem and a political question might exist. Thus, those six
15. Id. at 217.
16. Id. at 211.
17. Id. (citing Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635 (1854) (finding that the court could not
determine the issue of whether a Spanish official had the authority to enter into a
treaty with the United States, which effectively nullified the plaintiff's business deal
involving property in Florida, because such was nonjusticiable as a question for the
President and Senate)).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 217.
20. Id. (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518 (1969)).
20121 103
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questions must be viewed with the understanding of that specific goal:
to help explore whether separation of powers is at issue. This
ultimate concern is what should guide courts moving forward.
III. The Political Question Doctrine in Human Rights
Litigation
The political question doctrine emerged in human rights
litigation in the United States through claims typically brought under
the ATS" and the Torture Victim Protection Act 22 (TVPA). Since
then, defendants have raised the political question doctrine in
approximately thirty-four of these human rights cases.23 Of these
21. The case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), was the first
modern case to bring claims for violations of the laws of nations under the Alien Tort
Statute (also referred to, especially in the earlier era of ATS litigation, as the Alien
Tort Claims Act).
22. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
23. Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 487 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 2007), reheard en banc, 499
F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), reheard en banc, 499 F.3d 923 (9th Cir. 2007), affd Nos. 02-
56256, 02-56390, 09-56381, 2011 WL 5041927, *15 (9th Cir. Oct. 25, 2011); Al-Aulaqi
v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010); EI-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United
States, 607 F.3d 836 (D.C. 2010); Matar v. Dichter, 563 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009); Harbury
v. Hayden, 522 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, Harbury v. Hayden, 555 U.S.
881 (2008); Corrie v. Caterpillar Inc., 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe v. Exxon
Mobile Corp., 473 F.3d 345 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Gonzalez-Vera v. Kissinger, 449 F.3d
1260 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Bancoult v. McNamara, 445 F.3d 427 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Alperin
v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005); Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 402
F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 2005); Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d
Cir. 1995); Linder v. Portocarrero, 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992); Klinghoffer v.
S.N.C. Achille Lauro, 937 F.2d 44 (2d Cir. 1991); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Al-Quraishi v. Nikhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702 (D. Md.
2010), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, Nos. 10-1891, 10-1921, 2011 WL
4382115 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Techn. Inc., 657 F.
Supp. 2d 700 (E.D. Va. 2009), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, No. 09-1335,
2011 WL 4382081 (4th Cir. Sept. 21, 2011); In re South Africa Apartheid Litig., 617 F.
Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re XE Servs. Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d 569
(E.D. Va. 2009); Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473 (D. Md. 2009) motion to
cert. appeal denied, CIVIL PJM 07-1809, 2009 WL 2487083 (D. Md. Aug. 12, 2009)
and aff'd in part, appeal dismissed in part sub nom., Lizarbe v. Rondon, 402 F. App'x.
834 (4th Cir. 2010); Vine v. Republic of Iraq, 459 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C. 2006), rev'd
on other grounds by Simon v. Republic of Iraq, 529 F.3d 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2008), rev'd
on other grounds by Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S. Ct. 2183 (2009), and vacated,
330 F. App'x. 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009), and aff'd sub nom. by Simon v. Republic of Iraq,
330 F. App'x. 3 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp.
2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7
(E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff'd, Vietnam Ass'n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem.
Co, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008); Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 391 F. Supp. 2d 10 (D.D.C.
[Vol. 35:1104
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cases, courts have dismissed approximately fourteen - thus less than
half - based on the political question doctrine. Of the fourteen cases,
six were cases against United States officials and/or the United
States.24
Of the remaining cases, six cases were against corporations or
banks for aiding and abetting human rights violations. Four of these
cases were properly dismissed under the political question doctrine
because they involved World War II reparations that were the subject
of negotiations and treaties between countries" and one was an
aberration that, given subsequent decisions regarding corporations,
would likely have been decided differently. Lastly, there was Corrie
v. Caterpillar Inc., which had an Israeli connection.2
Other cases dismissed on political question grounds included one
against an Israeli official in Matar v. Dichter;27 one against Israel in
Doe I v. Israel;' and one against Japan in Hwang Geum Joo v.
Japan.2 Importantly, of all the cases against foreign officials where
the political question doctrine was raised,30 only the case of Matar
2005); Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp. 2d 86 (D.D.C. 2005); Schneider v.
Kissinger, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D.D.C. 2004), affd 412 F.3d 190 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
Knox v. Palestine Liberation Org., 306 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427-28, 448-49 (S.D.N.Y.
2004); Biton v. Palestinian Interim Self-Gov't Auth., 310 F. Supp. 2d 172 (D.D.C.
2004); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289;
In re Nazi Era Litigation Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d
370 (D.N.J. 2001); Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999);
Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999). Cases such as Knox
and Biton were not brought under the ATS, but such claims did bring tort actions in
violation of human rights norms.
24. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1; El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co., 607 F.3d 836;
Harbury, 522 F.3d 413; Gonzalez-Vera, 449 F.3d 1260; Bancoult, 445 F.3d 427;
Schneider, 310 F. Supp. 2d 251. Given that these cases involved officials arguably
engaging in United States foreign policy, the dismissals based on political question
doctrine is easier to defend analytically than those involving foreign officials.
25. Alperin, 410 F.3d 532; Iwanowa, 67 F. Supp. 2d 424; Nazi Era Litigation, 129
F. Supp. 2d 370; Burger-Fischer, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248.
26. 503 F.3d 974.
27. 563 F.3d 9.
28. 400 F. Supp. 2d 86.
29. 413 F.3d 45. The dismissal of this case can also be defended analytically, as
the subject of the suit - compensation for women being forced into sexual slavery
during World War II- had been the topic of negotiations and agreements by the
Japanese government.
30. The four human rights cases where the political question doctrine was raised
that involved foreign defendants (or defendants who were foreign officials at the time
of the alleged abuses) but were all allowed to proceed against the individuals include
Linder, 963 F.2d 332, involving claims against a Nicaraguan contra leader; Kadic, 70
2012]1 105
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against an Israeli official was dismissed as nonjusticiable.
A. The Earliest Cases Involving the Political Question Doctrine
Were Against the PLO
Interestingly, two of the earliest cases alleging violations of the
law of nations in which the defendant argued for dismissal based on
the political question doctrine involved the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
and were against the PLO. Neither was ultimately dismissed on that
basis. The first was Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, which
involved survivors and representatives of those murdered in a 1978
armed attack on a civilian bus in Israel, was based on claims for
violations of the law of nations and various treaties." Although other
defendants were named, the case focused on the acts of the PLO and
three different concurring opinions dismissed the case, each on
different bases.32 Although the court dismissed on other grounds, a
majority of the judges refrained from dismissing the claims against the
PLO as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine.33
Judge Edward read the political question doctrine narrowly,
rejecting the notion that courts should not hear cases simply because
they arise in a political or highly charged context.34 He found that the
separation of powers issue was not implicated in the case, and that the
court was not being asked to review the exercise of authority
constitutionally committed to another branch of United States
government."
Judge Bork refrained from deciding if he would dismiss the case
on the basis of the political question doctrine, noting that many of the
concerns governing the issue of whether the political question
F.3d 232, a 1995 case involving war crimes and other human rights abuses by the self-
proclaimed president of Serbia; Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, a 1996 case involving a former
Ethiopian official accused of torture and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment,
and Lizarbe, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473, a 2009 case involving a former Peruvian army
lieutenant accused of torture and other abuses arising out of a massacre on a
Peruvian village.
31. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 775.
32. See id. at 385 n.1 (Edwards, J. concurring) and id. at 415 n.13 (Bork, J.
concurring) (both noting that the claim against Libya was barred by the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act, and claims against the other defendants were too
insubstantial).
33. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring in part) (noting he would have dismissed the
case based on the political question doctrine alone).
34. Id. at 797.
35. Id.
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doctrine would prohibit the suit were the same as those surrounding
-the question of whether the courts should use their common law
powers to provide plaintiffs with a cause of action in the first place."
Thus, he refrained from deciding the issue.
Judge Robb, who advocated dismissal on the grounds of
nonjusticiability, opined that the case should be dismissed primarily
because the issues involved and the topic of international terrorism
were simply too complex for judicial competence or management.3 7
Moreover, the questions connected to international terrorism and
how to respond were within the exclusive domain of the executive
and legislative branches." He was also concerned that the
establishment of jurisdiction over the PLO would give more
recognition to the group than it deserved and would possibly provide
a forum for "the exposition of political propaganda, and the
debasement of commonly accepted notions of civilized conduct."" In
summary, he articulated that because of the horrible evil of terrorism
and the complexity of terrorist networks, any response would need to
be from the Executive or Congress. Thus, even though Judge Robb
would have dismissed the case on political question grounds, unlike
the cases involving Israeli conduct discussed infra, he would not have
heard the case given his animosity against the PLO and all it stood
for.
The next notable human rights case to address the political
question doctrine was Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro, in which
the PLO allegedly killed a Jewish-American passenger during the
1991 capture of an Italian passenger liner. 40 The PLO denied any
involvement in the hijacking or murder, and argued that its
involvement was limited to securing the surrender of the hijackers
and ensuring safe passage of the ship and its passengers. 4' The PLO
requested that the case be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political
question, because it "raises foreign policy questions and political
questions in a volatile context lacking satisfactory criteria for judicial
determination."42 The court noted that the PLO described itself as
36. Id. at 803.
37. Id. at 823-24.
38. Id. at 826-27.
39. Id. at 826.
40. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 47.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 49.
2012] 107
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the internationally recognized representative of the Palestinian
people, that it had declared statehood, and that it had diplomatic
recognition from some nations, excluding the United States.43 The
court stated that "the fact that the issues before us arise in a
politically charged context does not convert what is essentially an
ordinary tort suit into a nonjusticiable political question."" Quoting
Baker, the court noted that "the [political question] doctrine 'is one of
'political questions', not one of 'political cases"' and that the common
law of tort provided clear, settled rules of law for judicially
discoverable and manageable standards.45 There was no need for an
initial policy decision concerning terrorism, the court opined, given
that the PLO had maintained the acts were ones of piracy, the other
branches had endorsed the concept of suing terrorist organizations,
no prior political decisions had been made that would require
questioning, and the lawsuit was consistent with the attitude toward
terrorists.' Given the uniformity of opinion regarding terrorism and
that there was no potential for embarrassment or multifarious
pronouncements by the Executive, Congress, or the courts on that
issue, the court found that there was no need to find the case
nonjusticiable under Baker and rejected the PLO's motion to
dismiss.47
B. Later Cases Against the PLO
Despite substantial progress in relations between the United
States and the PLO in the 1990s,48 courts continued to refuse to
dismiss cases against the PLO on political question grounds. In Biton
v. Palestinian Interim Self Gov't, plaintiffs brought claims against the
Palestinian National Authority (PA) and the PLO in connection with
43. Id. at 46.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
46. Id. at 49.
47. Id. at 50.
48. The United States reversed its official position that the PLO is a terrorist
organization. In 1993, Clinton announced the United States and the PLO would re-
establish their dialogue. Arafat, on behalf of the PLO, participated in the 1993
negotiations and signing of Oslo Accords under President Clinton. That same year,
Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people. Other
examples include the 1995 Interim Agreement between Israel and the Palestinians
(represented by Arafat - PLO); the opening of the PLO Mission office in
Washington D.C. in 1994; and representing the PLO in the United States.
108 [Vol. 35:1
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the 2000 roadside bombing of a school bus transporting children and
teachers from an Israeli settlement in Gaza.49 They alleged violations
under various tort theories and under the Antiterrorism Act of 1991
(ATA)." The defendants argued that the case should be dismissed on
several bases, including the political question doctrine," because the
allegations were political attacks upon the PA, the PLO, the
President of Palestine, Yasser Arafat, and senior Palestinian
officials.12 The allegations were too wide in scope to be justiciable,
thus raising issues that were not appropriate or capable of judicial
resolution." The court noted that the defendants "also remark that
the conduct in question might be deemed an 'act of war' not subject
to the ATA, and that Palestinian resistance and self-defense against
Israel do not constitute terrorism." 54
Defendants relied heavily on Linder v. Portocarrero." In that
case, a United States engineer in Nicaragua was allegedly tortured
and killed by the Nicaraguan Democratic Force, which was part of the
Contra movement." His family filed suit against three anti-
government military organizations and several individuals for
numerous state tort claims and claims under international law." The
district court dismissed the claims under international law filed
against the organizations on the basis of the political question
doctrine." The Eleventh Circuit reversed with regard to the
individual defendants, finding the state common law torts claims
against them could go forward. 9 Regarding the organizations, the
appellate court affirmed the district court's decision, finding that the
court adjudicating the claim is required "'to measure and carefully
assess the use of the tools of violence and warfare in the midst of a
foreign civil war,' and to inquire into 'the relationship between




53. Id. at 183.
54. Id. at 175.
55. Linder, 963 F.2d at 332.
56. Id. at 333.
57. Id.
58. Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1467 (S.D. Fla. 1990), rev'd
sub nom., 963 F.2d 332 (11th Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 337.
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United States policy and the actions of the [C]ontras."'m
The Biton court found that the case did not present a
*61nonjusticiable political question, stating:
Although the backdrop for this case-i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict-was extremely politicized, the circumstance alone is
insufficient to make the plaintiffs' claims [nonjusticiable.] Indeed,
"the fact that the issues . . . arise in a politically charged context
does not convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a
[nonjusticiable] political question." 62
Similarly, in Knox v. PLO, a court refused to dismiss a case
involving an American citizen killed in Israel during a terrorist attack
in 2002. The decision was based on political question grounds, but at
the same time recognized that the violence was part of an ongoing
historical and complex political situation, and that the parties' legal
skirmishes paralleled their struggles." The court recited the various
accusations by each side regarding terrorism, illegal occupation, and
excessive military force by Israel, then dispensed with the accusations
so that it could focus on the rather simple question of whether a
cognizable and valid claim existed.6 In refusing dismissal, the court
noted that none of the controversial and intractable issues
insusceptible to judicial decision were before it. 65 In fact, the court
found the case justiciable with no need to address "political questions
which form the backdrop to this lawsuit."" It further opined that
Defendants' view essentially would ask the Court to hold that, even
if the facts were to verify the accusations here, a wanton massacre
of innocents would still be "non-justiciable." This proposition cuts
against the grain of what compels the business of the courts. It
would rub every syllable of justice out of the concept of
justiciability. ...
Like in Biton and Knox, in Ungar v. PLO, the First Circuit found
that shooting victims' claims against the PLO were justiciable because
60. Biton, 310 F. Supp. 2d.at 184 (citing Linder, 963 F.2d at 335).
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 427-28, 448-49.
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the fundamental nature of the action was a tort suiti 8 The case
involved the 1996 Hamas Islamic Resistance Movement's group
shooting of a United States citizen, his wife, and their infant son while
they were driving their car in Israel.' In applying the Baker factors,
the court refused to dismiss the case as nonjusticiable." First, the
court found the lower court's immunity decision did not signal an
official position regarding the recognition of Palestine or amount to
an usurpation of another branch's power." Moreover, it found that
the very purpose of the ATA was "to allow the courts to determine
questions of sovereign immunity under a legal, as opposed to a
political, regime." 72  Secondly, that the court had appropriate
standards for resolving the issue and was not making initial policy
decisions outside of its judicial discretion.73  Lastly, the court found
that it did not need to address the last three factors from Baker,
reasoning that such analysis would only be appropriate "for judicial
resolution of a question would contradict prior decisions taken by a
political branch in those limited contexts where such a contradiction
would seriously interfere with important governmental interests."7 4 It
found that this was not the case in the claims before it." The court
concluded by stating:
The reality is that, in these tempestuous times, any decision of a
United States court on matters relating to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict will engender strong feelings. Be that as it may, the
capacity to stir emotions is not enough to render an issue
nonjusticiable. For jurisdictional purposes, courts must be careful
to distinguish between political questions and cases having political
overtones.76
68. Ungar, 402 F.3d at 280.
69. Id. at 276.
70. Id. at 280-81.
71. Id. at 281.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. (citing Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 281.
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IV. The Courts Have Dismissed All Cases Alleging
International Law Violations by Israel or Israeli Officials as
Nonjusticiable Political Questions
The problem with the Baker factors as applied in human rights
cases is that the factors are so vague and susceptible to misapplication
that courts' concerns with the political ramifications of a case, or the
political context, seeps into their analysis and often leads them away
from their Article III responsibilities to adjudicate cases properly
before them. This can be seen in the courts' dismissals on political
question grounds of cases alleging Israeli violations of human rights in
the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)." The opinions in these
cases contain analyses that are inconsistent and intellectually
problematic; they contradict the warnings in Baker and other cases
that lawsuits should not be dismissed simply because they arise in
political situations or have foreign policy ramifications. They also
stand in stark contrast to other, similar cases. Below, I discuss the
three cases that courts have dismissed as nonjusticiable political
questions.
Doe I v. Israel
In Doe I v. Israel, several plaintiffs, including Palestinians living
in the West Bank, Israel, and the United States, brought suit against
numerous Israeli and United States defendants for a variety of
international human rights law violations such as funding or assisting
the settlement activity in the West Bank." The plaintiffs alleged that
the West Bank was Palestinian land, that the Israeli government
encouraged the illegal confiscation of the land for illegal settlement
activity, and that the United States had turned a "blind eye" upon the
illegal activity. 9
The district court granted motions to dismiss filed by contractor
defendants and the United States federal defendants (including
former President George W. Bush and former Secretary of State
77. See, e.g., Matar v. Dichter 500 F. Supp. 2d 284,286 (S.D.N.Y. 2007 ), affd, 563
F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 2009); Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., 403 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1022-23 (W.D.
Wash. 2005), affd, 503 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2007); Doe I v. State of Israel, 400 F. Supp.
2d 86, 96 (D.D.C. 2005).
78. 400 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
79. Id. at 98.
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Colin Powell).80 Concluding that plaintiffs had asked the court to
decide a nonjusticiable political question, the court stated that "claims
involving arms sales to Israel - which occurred pursuant to a sensitive
and detailed statutory and regulatory scheme inextricably intertwined
with critical foreign policy decisions - are nonjusticiable political
questions better left to consideration by the political branches."8 1 In
2005, the district court dismissed the case against the remaining,
mostly Israeli defendants on several grounds,' including the political
question doctrine."
The dismissal of the case under the political question doctrine is
the most defensible of all the cases regarding Israel's activities
discussed herein. However, the court's decision was still problematic
in many ways. Although the language used in the plaintiffs'
complaint did not help their cause,' it is clear that the court was
influenced in its analysis by the fact that Israel was the country whose
conduct was at issue. Like most courts, it dutifully noted that the
political question doctrine was truly about the separation of powers
and recited the Baker factors. However, it then incorrectly called
the Baker factors "categories" of nonjusticiability.86 The six items
outlined in Baker are not categories, but factors to be considered
when ascertaining whether the claim is a political question. Baker
does not stand for the proposition that if a case "fits" into one of the
categories, it should be dismissed. By conceptualizing them as
"categories," the court was expanding Baker, and thus the political
question doctrine, well beyond its meaning and intention.
Moreover, the "categories" were conceptualized incorrectly. In
its analysis, the court stated that the first Baker factor, a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department, was "undeniably" implicated in this case. It
found that:
80. Doe v. State of Israel, No. 02-01431, slip op. at 15 (D.D.C. Oct. 3,2003).
81. Id. at 15.
82. Other grounds for dismissal included sovereign immunity, act of state
doctrine, and lack of personal jurisdiction. Doe I, 400 F. Supp.2d at 86, 104-14.
83. Id. at 111-12.
84. Id. at 98. The complaint alleged that Israel was a terrorist state, and
characterized the settlements in the West Bank as "non- or quasi-governmental
terrorist organizations." Id.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 111-12.
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It is hard to conceive of an issue more quintessentially political in
nature than the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which has
raged on the world stage with devastation on both sides for
decades. The region of the Middle East specifically, and the entire
global community generally, is sharply divided concerning these
tensions; American foreign policy has come under attack as a
result.
This commentary demonstrates that the court was persuaded by
the political nature of the case, not by having to decide a political
question.
In finding that the first Baker "category" was implicated, the
court concluded that it could not adjudicate the claims without ruling
on the issue of to whom the West Bank "actually" belonged. 9
Although it may initially appear that this is a legitimate concern of
the court, the court's concern was more related to the factual
allegations contained in the complaint than with the law it would have
had to decide. For example, although the plaintiffs alleged that the
land on which the settlers established settlements was Palestinian
land, it did not require the court to decide this issue as court are to
assume allegations as true when deciding a motion to dismiss.90
In any event, the analysis in Baker suggests that Doe I was
justiciable. In Baker, the Supreme Court stated that "while the
judiciary ordinarily follows the executive as to which nation has
sovereignty over disputed territory ... once sovereignty over an area
is politically determined and declared, courts may examine the
resulting status and decide independently whether a statute applies to
that area."9' The United States executive branch (and even Israel)
has consistently held that Israel does not have sovereignty over the
Palestinian Territories, including the West Bank.92 Moreover, for
decades the United States has maintained that the settlements are
illegal; Israel is the occupier of that territory." Thus, the court should
88. Id. at 112.
89. Id.
90. See id. at 98.
91. Baker, 369 U.S. at 212.
92. See, e.g., Human Rights Comm'n, Second Periodic Rep. of Israel, 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/ISR/2001/2 (2001); UNITED STATES DEP'T OF STATE, ANN. HUMAN
RIGHTS REP. SUBMITTED TO CONG., PUB. No. 16A, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED
TERRITORIES 1430, 1440 (1991).
93. See generally id.; see also UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HUMAN
RIGHTS REPORT ON ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES (2010),
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have been able to adjudicate claims regarding the settlements based
on customary international law (and the Fourth Geneva Convention).
Doe I also involved allegations that Israel was a terrorist state
and characterized the settlements in the West Bank as "non- or quasi-
governmental terrorist organizations." 94 However, the motion to
dismiss did not require the court to decide whether Israel was a
terrorist state or whether the settlements were terrorist
organizations." Plaintiffs were asking the court to rule on whether
they had stated a claim.96 In fact, the court was supposed to take the
allegations contained in the complaint as true in ruling on its motion
to dismiss.97 Yet, the court found that it could not rule on whether the
allegations in the complaint had stated a legal, cognizable claim
because doing so would be drawing the court into the foreign affairs
of the United States. 98
In addition, the court mischaracterized some of the allegations
and drew its own conclusions that seemed inapposite to what
plaintiffs had alleged. For example, the court noted, "none of the
materials for which the defendants' contributions were 'earmarked'
available at http:///iwww.state.gov/g/dr1/r1s/hrrpt/2010/nea/154463.htm (last accessed
June 29, 2011). For example, in 1978, Herbert J. Hansel acting as the State
Department Legal Advisor issued an opinion stating that the settlements were illegal
under international law, an opinion that has not changed. Glenn Kessler, Old Legal
Opinion Raises New Questions, THE WASHINGTON POST (June 17, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/06/16/AR
20 0 9061 603 28
5.html; see also Matt Skarzynski, & Holly Byker, Israeli Statements on American
Policy toward Settlements by United States Government Officials - 1968-2009,
CHURCHES FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE, http://www.cmep.org/content/us-statements-
israeli-settlements-short (outlining statements made by each administration on the
settlements since the Johnson administration, all stating either that the settlements
were illegal, or ill-advised) (last accessed June 11, 2011).
94. 400 F. Supp. 2d at 98.
95. The court clearly was bothered by the allegations made in the complaint,
some of which, from both a practical and legal point of view are very troubling and
problematic. However, the court could have taken other action regarding these
allegations. For example, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) allows the court,
either upon motion or on its own, to "strike any redundant, immaterial, impertinent,
or scandalous matter." Arguably, some of the allegations about Israel in the
complaint were immaterial to the legal questions involved, such as whether Israel is a
terrorist state.
96. Doe 1, 400 F. Supp.2d at 100.
97. Id. ("In accordance with the more relaxed standards that apply to pleadings
at the motion to dismiss stage, plaintiffs' factual allegations must be taken as true.")
(citing Kowal v. MCI Comm. Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
98. Id.
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consisted of offensive or aggressive equipment, rather, the materials
were all in the nature of protective and defensive equipment."99 Yet,
in reaching this conclusion, the court cited sections of the plaintiffs'
complaint wherein they make allegations nearly inapposite to what
the court concluded:
These are not merely general contributions of funds, but rather are
earmarked specifically for various military purposes, including
dozens of bullet proof vests and body armor, night-vision goggles,
armored jeeps and ambulances, floodlights, ballistic helmets,
communications equipment, gun cabinets, generators, and even
security fence repairs.
Thus, it is clear when reviewing this case the court was influenced
by the fact that it was Israel's actions that were being sued upon.
Shortly thereafter, however, the court in Vine v. Republic of Iraq
allowed a case against Iraq to go forward, rejecting the executive
branch's argument that allowing the case to go forward would create
a more unstable Iraq and thus impact foreign policy goals.' The
court found the case did not require an evaluation of any executive or
congressional policy decision or value judgment. Rather, it involved
the liability of a foreign sovereign. 02 The court cited Klinghoffer in
declining to "convert what is essentially an ordinary tort suit into a
nonjusticiable political question" merely because its claims "arise in a
politically charged context."'o On appeal, the D.C. Circuit agreed,
refusing to dismiss the case against Iraq under the political question
doctrine even though the executive and legislative branches'
unequivocal position was that the case would interfere with the
foreign policy of the United States in Iraq.
Later, in Simon v. Iraq, American citizens who were allegedly
tortured and/or held hostage in Kuwait and Iraq during Gulf War
brought personal injury actions against the Republic of Iraq, Iraq's
security services, and Saddam Hussein."' Iraq argued (in addition to
arguments regarding the FSIA) that the claims should be barred
under the political question doctrine." Iraq pointed to presidential
99. Id. at 99.
100. Id.
101. Vine, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
102. Id. at 20.
103. Id.
104. Simon, 529 F.3d 1187.
105. Republic of Iraq, 129 S. Ct. at 2189.
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and congressional statements, executive orders, and an act passed by
the Foreign Relations Committee, all of which indicated that such
suits against Iraq threatened the orderly reconstruction of Iraq and
were thus contrary to the interests of the United States.t' Despite
that, the court still found that the political question doctrine did not
bar the claims, taking a very narrow reading of the political doctrine,
and held that the possibility a case may affect, or even contravene, the
foreign policy of the United States was not enough to render the case
nonjusticiable.10 ' Yet, the court still found that the political question
doctrine did not bar the claims, taking a very narrow reading of the
political question doctrine that the possibility a case may affect, or
even contravene, the foreign policy of the United States was not
enough to find the case nonjusticiable. The court noted that the case
did not require it to address any question constitutionally committed
to the political branches."os Since the case presented issues
constitutionally committed to the judiciary by Article III, "Congress
has given the courts of the United States the jurisdiction to decide the
legal issues and factual questions raised by the plaintiffs' allegations,
which sound in tort; accordingly the courts have the duty to proceed
to the extent the actions are justiciable."'09
This case appears, on its face, to contain a very different analysis
than that in the D.C. district court's opinion in Doe v. Israel. An
argument can be made that in the early cases against the PLO and in
this case against Iraq the ATA provided for a tort action against these
countries or entities.1o On its face that seems to be an important
distinction; that argument is weakened, however, when one considers
that in cases against Israeli officials, the TVPA could also provide the




109. Id. It should be noted that a court also dismissed a case against Japan based
on, inter alia, the political question doctrine. In Hwang Geum Joo, a district court
had also dismissed an action against Japan by women who had been forced to be
"comfort women" during World War II on the grounds that certain treaties by
various countries, including the women's countries and the United States, were
signed with Japan after WWII that attempted to resolve issues of the rights of each
country's nations. 413 F.3d at 52-53. Moreover, opining on whether the appellants'
countries resolved their claims in negotiating peace treaties with Japan, was a foreign
policy issue, not a judicial issue. Id. In this way, this case is very similar to the
Burger-Fischer and Nazi Era Litigation cases.
110. 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2001).
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the ATS would provide jurisdiction for common law claims. Thus, it
seemed that the fact that a statute exists giving the plaintiffs the right
to sue is not a persuasive argument against the political question
doctrine.
Corrie v. Caterpillar
In 2001 in Corrie v. Caterpillar, the family of Rachel Corrie, a
young United States woman protesting the demolition of civil homes
in the OPT, and five Palestinian families, whose family members were
injured or killed during the Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) home
demolitions, sued Caterpillar, Inc. for aiding and abetting human
rights violations."' The IDF killed Corrie with a Caterpillar
bulldozer.112 The suit alleged that Caterpillar knew the bulldozers it
sold to the IDF would be used to commit human rights and
humanitarian law violations and yet sold the vehicles directly to the
IDF."' The complaint noted that the sale was not to the United
States government for eventual sale to Israel through the Foreign
Military Sales Program but rather a Direct Commercial Sale.114
The district court dismissed the case on several bases, including
the political question doctrine."' The court's discussion of the
political question doctrine (and Act of State doctrine which it seems
to comingle with the political question doctrine) is problematic. It is
apparent that the court dismissed the action because it was a
"political case," exactly what Baker prohibits courts from doing.
First, the court dutifully recited the oft-quoted parts of Baker
and outlined the six Baker factors but dismissed the case with
virtually no analysis."' The court then focused on the request for
injunctive relief enjoining the sale of bulldozers without addressing
the damages portion of the case."' Although one can potentially
understand the court's decision regarding the enjoinder as a "foreign
policy decision" infringing on the prerogatives of the executive
branch,"' the court's decision regarding the damages portion of the
111. 403 F. Supp. 2d at 1022-23.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1023.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1032.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1023.
118. Id.
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case is perplexing. After stating. that "this case must also be dismissed
because it interferes with the foreign policy of the United States of
America,""' the court relied on the fact that neither Congress nor the
Executive had done anything to stop the sales, citing a case
supporting federal law preemption of a state law prohibiting
companies from doing business in Burma.120 The court agreed with
Caterpillar that the lawsuit "challenge[d] the official acts of an
existing government in a region where diplomacy is delicate and
United States interests are great." 21  Although it is unclear if this
statement applied to the political question, the court erred to the
extent that it relied on the circumstances in the "region" where the
plaintiffs' injuries occurred to find their claims nonjusticiable. A
"politically charged" context does not transform claims into political
*122questions.
The court's reasoning is also problematic, because the State
Department had criticized the types of demolitions at issue in the
case.m2 The logical extension of the court's reasoning is that any case
alleging human rights violations for conduct even partly tied to
United States funds should be dismissed - even in those cases where
the United States Department of State has criticized the conduct at
issue. The district court court's opinion can also be read as taking this
position only in areas "where diplomacy is delicate and United States
interests are great." This would mean that at a minimum all cases
against private contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan (assuming all are
paid with United States funds) alleging human rights violations
should be dismissed on political question grounds, although none
have been.'24 Similarly, if the court's analysis is correct, all cases
119. Id. at 1032. The court could have dismissed only the portion of the complaint
asking that the sales be enjoined, but rather dismissed the entire action, including the
damages section.
120. Id. (citing Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 383-86,
(2000)).
121. Id.
122. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 249.
123. See, e.g., Corrie Complaint, 2005 WL 976855, at *9 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 16,
2005); Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, 2005 WL
2860538, at n. 61-62 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 15, 2005) (citing Press Conference with
William J. Burns, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, State Department, in
Bahrain (Jan. 12, 2002)); STATE DEPARTMENT BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, ISRAEL AND THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES COUNTY REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 2004, The Occupied Territories Appendix § 1(f), (g) and § 4 (2005).
124. See discussion regarding these cases, infra, at 27-28.
2012]1 119
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
against United States corporations in which the United States has not
enjoined their behavior should be dismissed on political question
grounds, at least in areas where "diplomacy is delicate and United
States interests are great." That would lead to an absurd result and
would be contrary to what the courts have done regarding cases
against corporations for aiding and abetting human rights violations.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit confirmed the dismissal on political
question grounds, without reaching the other issues in the case.'25
Although the appellate court's analysis was clearer than the district
court's, its holding still demonstrates incongruities that can only be
explained by the involvement of Israeli actions. The court relied on
the fact that United States funds ultimately paid for Israel's purchase
of the bulldozers in affirming the dismissal.'26
Plaintiffs acknowledged on appeal that the purchases occurred
through the FMF program and that United States funds were likely
used for the purchase.127 However, the plaintiffs argued that the
decision to fund the bulldozers was not a United States foreign policy
decision that would trigger the political question doctrine; the
decision had been mischaracterized as an active decision by the
United States government."' Plaintiffs stated that the language used
for the purchase indicated routine ministerial approval (akin to a
"rubber stamp"), that the United States government had not known
of the actual use for the bulldozers and had not specifically approved
funding for the bulldozers to be used for the purposes which resulted
in harm to plaintiffs.129 For example, in its amicus brief the State
Department condemned the use of bulldozers in home demolitions."o
125. Corrie, 503 F.3d at 977.
126. Id. at 980 ("Undisputed evidence in the record suggests that the United States
pays for every bulldozer the IDF purchases from Caterpillar."). See also id. at 982
(noting that "the decisive factor" was that the United States paid for the Caterpillar
sales to Israel) and id. at 978 (citing facts in the record establishing that Caterpillar
sells the bulldozers directly to Israel, with Israel then getting approval from the
Defense Security Cooperating Agency (DSCA), an arm of the Department of
Defense, to use United States military aid money for funding the purchases, and a
2001 letter from the DSCA to the IDF approving the use of funds to purchase the
bulldozers.).
127. Id. at 978.
128. Appellant's Reply Brief, Corrie v. Caterpillar, 503 F.3d 974, 2006 WL
3380610 (Sept. 5, 2006) at *27.
129. Id.
130. Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Affirmance,
Corrie, 503 F.3d 974 (No. 05-36210) 2006 WL 2952505, at *1.
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Therefore, the plaintiffs argued that purchase could not be considered
a "foreign policy determination" by the United States to create a
political question that would make the case nonjusticiable.
The fact that this case involved Israel and Palestine clearly
affected the court's decision. Notably, the court found that it could
not find for the plaintiffs without questioning or condemning United
States foreign policy toward Israel."' The court pointedly said that
"in this regard, we are mindful of the potential for causing
international embarrassment were a federal court to undermine
foreign policy decisions in the sensitive context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict."132
Prior to Corrie, courts adjudicated the issue of nonjusticiability
under the political question doctrine in six cases against corporations.
In all but one of those cases,133 the courts rejected the argument that
the cases should be dismissed on political question grounds, holding
that it was only the corporations' decisions that were at issue, not
political policies.134 In refusing to dismiss the cases, the courts ignored
the State Department's requests for dismissals and fear of potential
foreign policy consequences.
Since Corrie, courts have refused to dismiss every human rights
case against a corporation that has raised nonjusticiability as a
defense. They consistently held that the political question doctrine
did not apply and so was not a basis for dismissal."' This has included
cases analogous to Corrie, in particular, cases accusing contractors of
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Mujica, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. After considering the courts' analyses in the
five other cases (and in the four corporate cases where the political question issue
was raised), it appears Mujica was an aberration, and would likely have a different
result if heard again today based on a number of decisions since Mujica. I would like
to say the same thing about Corrie, but because it involves conduct by Israel, I am
skeptical that is the case.
134. See Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 347; In re Agent Orange
Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7; Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d 10; Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d
1193.
135. See, e.g., Rio Tinto, 487 F.3d at 1208; South Africa Apartheid Litig., 617 F.
Supp. 2d at 283-84; AI-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 714; Al Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d at
704; XE Services Alien Tort Litig., 665 F. Supp. 2d at 573. It should be noted that the
Rio Tinto court attempts to distinguish Corrie by saying that the United States
government "financed the conduct plaintiffs sought to challenge." Rio Tinto, 2011
WL 5041927, *15. However, the United States government did not fund the
demolitions; rather, United States funds were used to purchase the bulldozers used in
the demolitions.
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committing human rights violations in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In Al-Quraishi v. Nikhla, the court ruled that in cases involving
private military contractors the presence of a political question turns
on the level of actual control the military exerted over the
contractor's actions that led to the allegedly tortious conduct.136 The
court found that where the military was only minimally or
peripherally involved in the contractor's actions or decisions, or only
had control over a contractor at a general or theoretical level, the suit
did not raise a political question.3  Only where the military in fact
exerted controlling authority over a contractor's actions and those
actions resulted in a tort, might the case be nonjusticiable.' This
same reasoning should have resulted in Corrie not being dismissed on
political question grounds, given that the United States military did
not exert control over the IDF.
In Al Shamari v. CACI Premier Tech. Inc., the court refused to
dismiss on political question grounds a case involving a United States
government contractor performing interrogations and engaging in
torture at Abu Gharib prison in Iraq.13 ' The court ruled that the
plaintiffs were not challenging official United States policies or
directives, but the day-to-day conduct of the contractors, which the
United States government was not heavily involved in.140 Moreover,
the court found that the United States government had already made
a policy determination in enacting the ATS and that the political
branches had already spoken out against torture. Of course, this is
also true of the Israeli demolitions of civilian homes, but that made
no difference to the court in Corrie.141
Matar v. Dichter
In the 2007 case of Matar v. Dichter, plaintiffs brought suit
against Avraham Dichter, the former director of the Israeli General
Security Service (GSS).142  Plaintiffs were Palestinians or
representatives of Palestinians injured or killed when the IDF
bombed an apartment building in the Gaza City neighborhood of al-
136. AI-Quraishi, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 714.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Al-Shimari, 657 F. Supp. 2d at 704.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 286.
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Daraj in an attempt to assassinate a suspected Hamas leader.'43 They
claimed Dichter planned, authorized, and directed the bombing and
brought suit for violations of customary international human rights
law. The allegations included war crimes, crimes against humanity,
extrajudicial killing, and cruel, inhumane, and degrading treatment, in
addition to several municipal torts."
The defendant moved to dismiss the case on the grounds that he
had immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA)
and that the case presented a nonjusticiable political question. 4 5 The
then-Israeli Ambassador to the United States conveyed "concerns
regarding the fundamental inappropriateness and political nature of
the action. ,146 He also sent a letter to the State Department, filed
with the court, stating that the lawsuit "would embroil the United
States courts in evaluating Israeli policies and operations in the
context of a continuing armed conflict against terrorist operatives,"
and that it touched "directly upon issues related to the Middle East
peace process and ongoing and extensive diplomatic efforts."147 The
letter further stated that all of Mr. Dichter's actions were in the
course of his official duties and in furtherance of official policies of
the State of Israel.148
After finding the case should be dismissed under the FSIA, the
court stated that even if the FSIA were inapplicable, it would still
dismiss the case based on the political question doctrine. 149  The
court's political question doctrine analysis is unconvincing and
problematic. It mindlessly sets forth the requisite and oft-quoted
statements and factors but clearly does not engage in any
intellectually honest analysis of those factors to the case before it, let
alone a "discriminating analysis" of the question posed.5 o Rather, it
unabashedly ignores Baker's caution that the political question
doctrine "is one of 'political questions,' not one of 'political cases. 5'
143. Id. at 286-87.
144. Id. at 286.
145. Id. at 287. The defendant also moved to dismiss the case based on the act of




149. Id. at 293.
150. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
151. Id. at 217.
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That the court invoked the political question doctrine because of
the political nature of the case seems abundantly clear from the
opinion. It cited the fourth (expressing lack of due respect due
coordinate branches) and sixth (potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements) Baker factors as evidence that the case
involved a political question.1 2 The court noted that the defendant
was a high-ranking official of Israel, a United States ally, and that the
lawsuit criticized military actions in furtherance of Israeli foreign
policy, while ignoring the fact that the United States government
itself had criticized the action.' The court also highlighted the fact
that the Israeli policy that was criticized "involved a response to
terrorism in a uniquely volatile region." The court further stated that
"this court cannot ignore the potential impact of this litigation on the
Middle East's delicate diplomacy."' 54
The court blindly cited the State Department's Statement of
Interest in which it said that allowing the case to proceed would
"undermine the Executive's ability to manage the conflict at issue
through diplomatic means, or to avoid becoming entangled at all."'
The court did not even ask the State Department how, exactly, it
would be undermined or even how allowing the case to proceed
would have undermined the executive's potential desire to avoid
becoming entangled in the case. The court, citing Doe , stated that
"consideration of the case against this unique backdrop would
impede the Executive's diplomatic efforts and, particularly in light of
the Statement of Interest," would cause the sort of intra-
governmental dissonance and embarrassment that gives rise to the
political question doctrine."' 6 Yet neither the court nor the State
Department indicated how exactly its diplomatic efforts would be
impeded. The court simply gave complete deference to the State
Department's Statement of Interest."' This is clearly inappropriate
for a "discriminating analysis." The conclusion that the Statement of
Interest itself can be the source of the dissonance or embarrassment
152. Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
153. Id. at 295.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Baker, 369 U.S. at 294.
157. Id. This becomes abundantly clear when reading the opinion and its notation
that in other cases, the State Department did not request the cases to be dismissed as
a major distinction between it and other cases.
[Vol. 35:1124
The Nonjusticiability of Palestine
referred to in Baker is completely misguided and incredibly
dangerous. The court did not describe how the litigation could
impact the delicate diplomacy of the Middle East. The court noted
that the Middle East is a region where "diplomacy is vital,""' yet the
same can be said of many parts of the world where other conduct
forming ATS claims have been found to be justiciable.'" Given that
the court noted several times that Israel was an "ally," (and a
"strategic" one at that),1 6 the attention it gave to the region of the
Middle East and the complete lack of any discriminating analysis
indicates that there was one reason, and one reason alone, that the
court dismissed the case: it involved Israel.
IV. Courts Have Found Other Cases Against Non-United
States Officials Be Justiciable
In all other cases in which violations of human rights were
against individuals who were not United States officials, even
individuals ostensibly acting on behalf of their government, courts
have refused to dismiss on political question grounds whenever that
defense has been raised."' For example, in Linder, the court rejected
dismissal under the political question doctrine, because the claims
challenged "neither the legitimacy of the United States foreign policy
toward the contras, nor [did] it require the court to pronounce who
was right and who was wrong in the Nicaraguan civil war.1 62" Relying
on Klinghoffer, the court held the case to be an ordinary tort suit. 163
In Kadic v. Karadic, the court held it would not interfere with
important government interests.1" In Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, the court
relied primarily on Linder in dismissing the political question
158. Id. at 296.
159. For example, see the Tel-Oren, Klinghoffer, Biton, Knox, and Ungar cases,
discussed supra at 8-13, all of which concerned the same part of the world; and the
cases discussed supra notes 30 and 137, concerning, inter alia, the former Yugoslavia
(Kadic); Nicaragua (Linder), Peru (Lizarbe), Papa New Guinea (Rio Tinto), and
South Africa (South Africa Apartheid Litigation).
160. Matar, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
161. Supra note 23.
162. 963 F.2d at 337.
163. Id. (citing Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49-50).
164. 70 F.3d at 250. The Second Circuit allowed claims against Karadic, the self-
described President of Serbia, for human rights violations to proceed because the
United States' government had taken a public position against Karadic and the
violations he engaged in.
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argument, with little analysis.16 1
Finally, in Lizarbe v. Rondon, which arose after Matar, the court
refused to dismiss a closely analogous case to Matar on the political
question grounds.166 In Lizarbe, the plaintiff sued a lieutenant in the
Peruvian army for torture and other torts arising out of a massacre of
a Peruvian village."' Just like in Matar, the defendant had been
accused of directing a massacre that resulted in civilians' deaths and
violations of customary international law. The court found Lizarbe
justiciable because the defendant's acts were not linked to any acts by
the United States military; in fact, the military had condemned the
acts. This was true despite the fact that Peru was an ally to the
United States, and even though the United States gave financial
support to the Peruvian army. The court cited Cabello v. Fernandez-
Larios, which said that courts have consistently adjudicated
ATS/TVPA claims brought against foreign military personnel whose
units received support from United States sources similar to that
which Peru received from the United States.'68 Yet, the court found
Matar nonjusticiable even though its only apparent difference from
Lizarbe was that Matar involved Israel.
V. Conclusion
Although the differing facts of these cases make the political
question issue complex, the courts' decisions in Doe, Maher, and
Matar are analytically problematic. The fact that claims may arise out
of ongoing conflicts in which the United States takes an interest does
not render them nonjusticiable. 169  Damages actions for incidents
165. 72 F.3d at 848.
166. 642 F. Supp. 2d at 492.
167. Id.
168. Cabello v. Fernandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1153 (11th Cir. 2005). In
Cabello, like many other cases, the defendant did not argue that the case was
nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine; thus it is not discussed herein or
included in the count of cases allowed to proceed where the political question
doctrine is raised.
169. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2645 (2004) (rejecting separation of
powers argument proffered to limit judicial review of "military decision-making in
connection with an ongoing conflict"); Ibrahim, 391 F. Supp. 2d. at 16 (finding
justiciable Iraqis' claims against private United States government contractors for
torture during Iraq war); Presbyterian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 347 (finding war
crimes claims against Sudan and private corporation justiciable despite civil war
context); Linder, 963 F.2d at 337 (complaint for the killing of a civilian by the
Nicaraguan contras against individuals justiciable since it "challenges neither the
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occurring in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict should be
justiciable, just as the Second Circuit found in Klinghoffer. In that
case, while conceding that its decision would "surely exacerbate the
controversy surrounding the PLO's activities," the court rejected the
defendant's claim that the case should be dismissed as nonjusticiable
simply because the case raised questions in a volatile context."' The
courts' opinions in the three cases involving Israel, Doe, Maher, and
Matar, contradict the opinions of other cases involving the Middle
East conflict where Israel was not a defendant."
The conflicting decisions and inconsistent analyses are partly the
result of historically incongruent decisions regarding the political
question doctrine.'72 As Judge Bork once famously said, the
"contours of the [political question] doctrine are murky and unsettled
as shown by the lack of consensus about its meaning among the
members of the Supreme Court and among scholars.""' Part of the
problem appears to be that the Baker test is vague and subject to
misunderstanding and mischaracterization. Thus, it is no wonder
courts have been inconsistent in their applications of the doctrine,
especially when cases before them may have an impact on foreign
affairs. This, combined with the very real, high passion and tensions
associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has resulted in courts
consciously or unconsciously finding that cases involving Israeli
actions in Palestine are simply nonjusticiable. Israeli action in
Palestine will continue to be deemed nonjusticiable until there is new,
clearer authority on the application of the political question doctrine,
legitimacy of the United States foreign policy toward the contras, nor does it require
the court to pronounce who was right and who was wrong in the Nicaraguan civil
war").
170. Klinghoffer, 937 F.2d at 49. See also Ungar, 402 F. 3d at 280 (shooting
victims' claims against PLO justiciable since the fundamental nature of the action was
a tort suit); Sharon v. Time, 599 F. Supp. 538, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (libel suit
regarding Sharon's role in the massacre of Palestinians was justiciable, since
"individual rights in domestic affairs are at stake, even where the litigation touches
upon sensitive foreign affairs concerns").
171. See, e.g., Biton, 310 F. Supp. 2d at 184 ("Although the backdrop for this case -
i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - is extremely politicized, this circumstance alone is
insufficient to make the plaintiffs' claims nonjusticiable."); Knox, 306 F. Supp. 2d 429
(finding no need to address "political questions which form the backdrop to this
lawsuit," court found claims against the PLO not barred by the political question).
172. However, the courts do seem to becoming more consistent in their
application more recently, at least with regard to non-United States officials, allowing
such claims to proceed.
173. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 803 n.8 (Bork, J. concurring in judgment).
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especially as it applies to human rights cases taking place abroad.
Only when the political question doctrine is clarified, narrowed, or
reformulated, will cases arising in clearly political contexts be
adjudicated with less contradiction and more analytical consistency.
Proposing such a new test is outside the scope of this Article.
However, the Supreme Court should clarify that the political question
doctrine is a jurisdictional doctrine guided by the separation of
powers as outlined in the Constitution and not a doctrine that allows
courts to dismiss cases out of prudential concerns. 17 This clarification
would allow the doctrine to be narrowed so that only cases asking a
court to directly address a political question will be clearly reserved
by the Constitution for one of the other branches. Only then can it be
dismissed as nonjusticiable. Such measures would provide clear
guidance, thus lessening the number of problematic dismissals in
cases involving Israeli actions in Palestine. Actions by all countries
should be governed by a rule of law consistently applied in our courts.
174. This is not to say that there might not be other doctrines of a prudential
nature that might lead a court to refrain from hearing a case in very specific
situations; but the political question doctrine should not be misused in this way.
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